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GLD-111        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-3717 
 ___________ 
 





THE ERIE TIMES; JOHN MEAD FLANAGIN; 
ROSEANNE CHEESEMAN, Jointly and Severally 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-00102) 
 District Judge:  Honorable David S. Cercone 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
 Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 31, 2013 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 







 Mel Marin appeals pro se from a District Court order dismissing his complaint.  





 In 2010, appellant Marin decided to run for Congress, challenging incumbent 
Congresswomen Kathy Dahlkemper for the Democratic Party nomination in 
Pennsylvania’s third congressional district.  On May 9 of that year, the Erie Times-News 
ran an article about the primary battles surrounding the seat.  The 1400-word piece was, 
by and large, about the ―crowded six-person Republican field,‖ but began by describing 
the upcoming Democratic primary: 
Kathy Dahlkemper emerged from a crowded primary field two years ago to 
claim the Democratic Party nomination for the 3rd Congressional District 
post.  She went on to defeat seven-term incumbent Republican Phil English 
in November 2008. 
 
This time around, the race has turned upside down. 
 
Dahlkemper is the incumbent, seeking a second two-year term in the U.S. 
House of Representatives in the May 18 primary. 
 
Dahlkemper, of Erie, faces a primary challenge from little-known Mel 
Marin, 56, a former Mercer County resident and a U.S. Army veteran who 
has consistently declined to answer requests from the press.  Marin filed an 
unsuccessful court challenge of Dahlkemper’s nominating petitions earlier 
this year. 
Kevin Flowers, Dahlkemper Faces Challenges: 6 Republicans, 1 Democrat Run for Her 
3rd District Seat, Eric Times-News, May 9, 2010, at B1 (emphasis added).  In the 
eventual contest, Dahlkemper would go on to ―easily defeat[]‖ Marin, receiving about 
three times as many votes.  See Kevin Flowers, Dahlkemper, Kelly to Face Off in 
Election, Erie Times-News, May 19, 2010. 
 A little less than a year later, Marin filed suit in federal court, asserting four claims 
against the Erie Times-News, John Mead Flanagin, and Roseanne Cheeseman (the latter 
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two defendants were alleged to be ―alter egos‖ of the paper).1  Count 1 of the complaint 
alleged defamation based on the ―consistently declined‖ language quoted above, count 2 
alleged intentional interference with prospective economic relations, count 3 alleged 
―conspiracy to violate‖ the First Amendment for ―refusing to campaign as the paper 
requires,‖ and count 4 alleged an additional First Amendment conspiracy based on the 
―abuse of the [First] Amendment by the press.‖  The gravamen of the action was that the 
May 9 article was part of a ―plan to place [Marin] in a false light, by implying to the 
public that [he] . . . is an irresponsible person who ignores this district and ignores all 
newspapers everywhere‖ and thus ―should not be taken seriously as a candidate.‖  
Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 1-1.  The complaint alleged two different kinds of injury.  First, it 
―directly‖ connected the defamatory statement to Marin’s loss in the Democratic primary.  
See Compl. ¶ 12.  Second, it postulated that the Times-News acted deliberately as part of 
its ―policy of destroying the careers and lives of any candidate‖ who failed to live at the 
paper’s beck and call by placing ―thousands of dollars of political ads‖ in the paper.  
Marin sought both monetary and injunctive relief; his damages calculations were based, 
in part, on the loss of his ―congressional salary over 20 years.‖ Compl. ¶ 37.  
 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing 
inter alia that the complaint ―fail[ed] to state a claim for which relief may be granted for 
defamation because the publication is not capable of a defamatory meaning.‖  The 
District Court granted the motion, holding that the ―statement upon which plaintiff’s 
                                                 
1
 In 2010, Marin filed suit in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, but withdrew his 
action voluntarily.  
 4 
 
complaint is grounded is not capable of being defamatory,‖ an issue of law that precluded 
relief for Marin.  ―[G]iven the frequency with which candidates can communicate with 
the public, it is irrational to infer that the average person would conclude plaintiff was an 
irresponsible and/or not a serious candidate simply because a single sentence in one 
newspaper article reported that he consistently declined to answer requests from the press 
without any indications as to the circumstances supplying the basis for the statement.‖  
Because ―[a]n innocuous sentence in a single news article is not enough to implant a 
negative impression of plaintiff in the mind of the average person,‖ it was not ―capable of 
lowering the community’s estimate of his personal or business reputation or exposing 
him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.‖  Determining that Marin’s remaining claims 
were premised on the validity of the defamation claim, the Court dismissed them too.  
Marin timely sought review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise ―plenary review over 
the District Court order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.‖  Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of 
N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  Because Marin has proceeded pro se 
throughout, his filings will be liberally construed, but he is still required to allege 
sufficient facts in his complaint to support a valid claim.  See Mala v. Crown Bar Marina, 
Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013).  To do so, Marin must plead enough facts, 
accepted as true, to plausibly suggest entitlement to relief.  Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 
352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675, 679 (2009)).   
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 ―Although replete with First Amendment implications, a defamation suit 
fundamentally is a state cause of action.‖  Jenkins v. KYW, 829 F.2d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 
1987) (citations omitted).  In resolving claims based on Pennsylvania law, ―we must do 
what we predict the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would do.‖  Wassall v. DeCaro, 91 
F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1996).  In the process, we must be mindful that ―publications 
concerning candidates must be accorded at least as much protection under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments as those concerning occupants of public office.‖  Monitor 
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971). 
III. 
A) Claim 1: Defamation 
 ―In Pennsylvania, the Uniform Single Publication Act, 42 [Pa. Cons. Stat.] 
§§ 8341–8345, sets forth the elements of a prima facie case in a defamation action.‖  
Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., 926 A.2d 899, 903 (Pa. 2007).  The first element, 
and the one at play here, is the ―defamatory character of the communication.‖  42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 8343(a)(1).  ―[A] statement is defamatory if it tends so to harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third 
persons from associating or dealing with him.‖  Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for 
Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1078 (3d Cir. 1985) (quotation marks, citations omitted).  ―The test 
is the effect the article is fairly calculated to produce, the impression it would naturally 
engender, in the minds of the average persons among whom it is intended to circulate.  
The words must be given by judges and juries the same signification that other people are 
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likely to attribute to them.‖  Boyer v. Pitt Publ’g Co., 188 A. 203, 204 (Pa. 1936); accord 
Tucker v. Fischbein, 237 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2001).  Although specific language in an 
article ―may be defamatory even though the subject of the defamatory language is not the 
focus of the article,‖  MacElree v. Phila. Newspapers, 674 A.2d 1050, 1054 (Pa. 1996), 
the context of the language may render a defamatory interpretation unreasonable, Thomas 
Merton Ctr. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 442 A.2d 213, 216 (Pa. 1981).   
Whether a publication is ―capable of defamatory meaning‖ is a legal question to 
be resolved by the court.
2
  See Rockwell, 442 A.2d at 215; see also Church of 
Scientology Int’l v. Behar, 238 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing that defamatory 
character ―should ordinarily be resolved at the pleading stage‖).  If the answer is ―no,‖ 
the case should be dismissed.  Tucker, 237 F.3d at 282; MacElree, 674 A.2d at 1053. 
 We agree with the District Court that the language in question, ―read as a whole, 
in context,‖ Marcone, 754 F.3d at 1078, was not capable of being defamatory in the way 
Marin suggests.  An isolated remark about a candidate’s isolation from the press corps, in 
an article that overwhelmingly directs its focus elsewhere, may be ―embarrassing or 
annoying‖ to the candidate, but it would not ―naturally engender‖ a defamatory effect in 
                                                 
2
 Marin maintains that we must accept as true his contention that the language in 
controversy is capable of defamatory meaning because he has pleaded the question with 
particularity.  Because this is a legal conclusion and not a factual one, however, it cannot 
be accepted as true simply because it is pleaded in the complaint.  Cf. Fowler v. UPMC 
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009).  Nor do we agree that the test is whether 
―no one could possibly find the innuendo damaging.‖  The case he cites for that 
proposition says nothing of the sort; rather, it evaluates the ―effect the allegedly false and 
defamatory communication is fairly calculated to produce and the impression it would 
naturally engender in the minds of those among whom it was intended to circulate.‖  
Petula v. Mellody, 588 A.2d 103, 108 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (citation omitted). 
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the minds of the average reader of the newspaper.  Id. at 282.  Given the article as a 
whole, which discusses each candidate and what his or her plans for office would be, the 
language would almost certainly be understood to explain the absence of a profile on 
Marin.  Marin rightly suggests that innuendo can transform the otherwise-innocuous into 
defamation by implication, see Rockwell, 442 A.2d at 216, but the meaning he suggests 
here—that he is unreliable, ―irresponsible[,] and not to be taken seriously‖—stretches the 
statement too thin.  We do not suggest that no person could form that opinion, or that 
Marin is unjustified in so doing, but as a matter of law, the statement as presented is 
incapable of being defamatory.   
B) Claim 2, 3, and 4: Intentional Interference With Prospective Economic Relations and 
―First Amendment‖ Claims 
 We agree with the District Court that these claims are all premised on the 
underlying existence of a defamation claim.  Even when read with the requisite degree of 
liberal construction, Marin’s ―First Amendment‖ claims are simply garden-variety 
defamation, contract, conspiracy, and tortious interference claims, which fail for the 
reasons set forth above or are otherwise inadequately pleaded under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).  
See also Glenn v. Point Park College, 272 A.2d 895, 898–99  (Pa. 1971).  They afford no 
independent basis for relief.  Furthermore, Marin’s theory of state action, which he 
employs in his attempt to lodge a constitutional cause of action against the Times-News 




(a private party), has no grounding in law.
3
    
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the District Court that dismissal was 
proper, and having reviewed Marin’s submissions both below and on appeal, we 
conclude that amendment would be inequitable or futile.  See Connelly v. Steel Valley 
Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 217 (3d Cir. 2013).  Thus, finding no substantial question to be 
presented, we will summarily affirm.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 
2011) (per curiam).  Marin’s motion to strike Third Circuit I.O.P. 10.6 is denied.4 
                                                 
3
 The Times-News might be surprised to learn, as Marin insists, that it has the power to 
―make[] or break[] candidates,‖ that it ―control[s] every race,‖ and that it ―undermine[s] 
the voting process in Erie County,‖ to such degree that it is ―effectively . . . a state actor‖ 
under Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).  After defeating Marin, Congresswoman 
Dalhkemper was endorsed by the Times-News.  See Editorial, Erie Times-News Lists 
Endorsements in Key Races, Erie Times-News, Nov. 1, 2010.  But she, in the end, would 
be ―knocked off‖ by ―Mike Kelly, the Republican car dealer and former Notre Dame 
University football player,‖ in the 2010 Republican landslide.  Kevin Flowers, Kelly 
Coasts, Erie Times-News, Nov. 3, 2010. 
 
4
 Marin argues that I.O.P. 10.6 is ―void for vagueness,‖ but does not explain how our 
procedure runs afoul of that doctrine.  Contrary to his assertions, we employ the same 
standard of review—plenary analysis—of orders granting and denying motions to dismiss 
whether evaluating them before or after briefing.  Thus, even if we have authority to 
―strike‖ our summary action procedure, the motion lacks merit. 
 
